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Comments and Casenotes
MAIL-ORDER INSURANCE:
THE F.T.C. RIDES AGAIN
By M Y M. WALKER
On May 15 of this year the Federal Trade Commission
issued Guides, effective as of July 14, for the Mail Order
Insurance Industry.' The Guides were obviously a re-
sponse to the rapid growth of the mail-order insurance
business in this country and to the increased alarm being
voiced about its consequences. In a recent ruling2 the
State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner of Florida
branded mail-order insurance as a "growing menace" to
the insurance industry and the policy buyer as well. He
characterized many mail-order companies as firms which
do not pay license fees, are not admitted to do business
in the state, and are not responsible to anyone to pay off
claims when they are submitted. They are, according to
him, out-of-state companies which advertise cut-rate in-
surance policies, solicit by mail, pay no taxes to the state,
pay off by mail (if at all), "operate through advertising,
more or less on the fringe of our huge insurance industry,
and all too often . . . give the entire industry a bad
name."
3
The proliferation of mail-order insurance companies is
not particularly phenomenal nor is it necessarily an evil.
It is one of many expectable results of the so-called na-
tionalization of commerce and of the widespread use of
direct mailing and mass communication advertising tech-
niques in modern business. What has made it a potential
menace, however, is the variation in licensing require-
' 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7904 (1964). Certain industries and products which
are regulated by the FTC under its power to enforce antitrust and trade
regulation laws, are governed or guided by special rules adopted for that
purpose by the FTC. These special guides and rules set forth in consider-
able detail what type of conduct is or is not likely to be in violation of the
law. Although they do not have the force of law themselves, they may be
considered "top authority" in judging what the Commission is likely to
consider unlawful and should be consulted first if there is any doubt about
a particular practice. The Guides currently in effect may be found in 2
Trade Reg. Rep. 7893-7939 (1964).
2 State Department Rulings, Ixs. L.J. 354 (June, 1964).
8 Ibid.
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ments from state to state as well as the general ineffective-
ness of individual state regulation in reaching such com-
panies.
The objectives and intent of the FTC in issuing the new
Guides are clearly stated in the introduction 4 and appear
to be in line with FTC concerns generally: to prevent decep-
tion of purchasers of insurance and maintain fair compe-
tition in the industry. They are applicable to all advertis-
ing and sales promotion of insurance sold or offered for
sale through the mails. The introduction states specifically,
however, that they are not to be understood as delimiting
the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to the bus-
iness of insurance under the Clayton Act 5 and Federal
Trade Commission Act 6 as such acts are affected by the
McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act.7
To understand the significance of this statement it is
necessary to review briefly the relation of these statutes
to each other and to the legal and legislative history of
insurance regulation in general. Under the earliest doc-
trine, insurance was not considered to be "commerce" at
all and regulation was confided entirely to the states.' The
landmark decision in United States v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Ass'n 9 reversed this, classified insurance as com-
merce, and by bringing it thus within the purview of fed-
eral regulation via the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion, threatened the established regulatory machinery of
the individual states."0 Among the federal statutes deriv-
ing from the commerce clause which would have been
applicable to the insurance business at this point were the
Clayton Act with its antitrust provisions and the Federal
Trade Commission Act which gave to the FTC broad
'Trade Reg. Rep. 7904 (1964).
S38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1959).638 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1959). The FTC is the
only administrative agency which enforces the antitrust and trade regula-
tion laws. It was created by the Federal Trade Commission Act and given
under it a variety of responsibilities and broad powers. Its chief function
is to enforce that Act's prohibition against unfair methods of competitibn
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and in conjunction, the Clayton
Act, dealing with price and other discriminations, exclusive dealing and
related arrangements, corporate acquisitions of stock and assets, and inter-
locking directorates. Violations of the Clayton Act, when found, have been
considered by definition to constitute "unfair trade practices" and fall
within the prohibition of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
759 Stat. 33 §§ 1, 2(a) (b) (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011,
1012(a) (b) (1959).
1 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868) : "Issuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce."
1 322 U.S. 533, rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944).
"10 rudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Annot., 164
A.L.R. 501, 502-03 (1946).
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power to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practice in
interstate commerce. Congress undertook to rectify the
situation by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which
returned regulation of insurance to the states, providing
specifically that neither the Federal Trade Commission
nor Clayton Acts, nor any other federal statute undertaking
to regulate the business of insurance were to apply in any
state which itself regulated the same areas." This presum-
ably settled the question, and the states, by enacting stat-
utes such as the Maryland act on unfair trade practices,'2
were considered to have foreclosed the possibility of in-
surance regulation by the FTC or any other federal
agency."1
On its face then, the specific disavowal in the Guides
appears to be a reaffirmation of the status quo. There is,
however, another statement in the introduction to the
Guides which belies the simplicity of this assumption. This
statement specifies that the Guides are intended for use
in states where mail-order insurance companies are either
unlicensed (and hence, presumably beyond the reach of
state regulation) or, if licensed, have no agents. That this
represents a change from the previous prevailing view can
be seen by comparing this excerpt from an article in the
Insurance Law Journal of October, 1963:
"The courts interpret licensing of insurance com-
panies as sufficient regulation for... [the] purpose [of
the McCarran Act[.]]. Thus, the Federal Trade Com-
mission is concerned only with insurance sold by mail
and not with all of that. If executives of an insurance
company want to avoid the Federal Trade Commission
entirely, they can do so simply by becoming licensed
in all states in which they accept business. Merely
being licensed is sufficient; they need not appoint
agents.... It is estimated that there are no more than
15 or 20 insurance companies of the roughly 2,000
currently operating, with which the Federal Trade
Commission is concerned.' 14
1 McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act § § 1, 2 (a) (b), 59 Stat. 33
(1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(a) (b) (1959). This act, which
provides for state regulation of insurance, specifies that the Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts are applicable to that business only to
the extent it is not regulated by state law.
12 MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 212-34 (1957; Repl. vol. 1964).
13 Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 217 F. Supp. 210
(S.D. N.Y. 1963) ; In re Aviation Ins. Indus., 183 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. N.Y.
1960) ; 29 AM. Jun. Insurance § 65 (1960).
"I Howard, The Current Status of Federal Regulation of Insurance, INs.
L.J. 581, 583 (October, 1963). (Emphasis added.)
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It is even more significant in the light of two recent Su-
preme Court decisions dealing with Federal Trade Com-
mission power to regulate mail-order insurance. These two
cases had to do with a qualification on state ability to regu-
late insurance which was recognized as early as the South
Eastern Underwriters decision. That decision said that it
was within the power of Congress "to govern affairs which
the individual states, with their limited territorial juris-
diction, are not fully capable of governing."' 15 The Mc-
Carran Act uses similar language in providing that "The
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be ap-
plicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law."'
The first of the two recent cases, FTC v. National Cas-
ualty Co.,'7 decided in 1958, held that where the foreign
insurer was licensed and had agents to whom advertising
matter was sent and who mailed it locally to state resi-
dents, the federal government was excluded from regulat-
ing because the state had legally sufficient control over the
insurer. Two years later, in FTC v. Travelers Health
Ass'n,1 it was held that where the foreign insurer was
neither licensed nor had agents in the state, and mailing
was direct to residents of the state, there was no adequate
regulation in the place where the deception was practiced
and had its impact. The fact that the state (Nebraska) in
which the insurer was organized had a statute on unfair
practices did not constitute regulation within the contem-
plation of the McCarran Act. On remand of the latter case
to the 8th Circuit, that court considered whether the state
provisions "are in legal concept sufficient in their form and
in their enforceability to be capable of controlling the mail-
ing of deceptive or unfair soliciting material.., into the
state."'19 It concluded that to the extent that one state must
depend on provisions, instrumentalities or processes of
another, it is not able to exercise the "ultimate legal com-
pulsion""9 necessary for effective regulation. With these
developments in mind, it is possible to recognize the im-
portance of the statement that the Guides are intended to
apply to insurers which are licensed in a state but have no
agents there. It seems safe to assume that the FTC has
15 United S-tates v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552,
rehearing denied, 323 U.S. 811 (1944). (Emphasis added.)
10 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1959).
17 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958).
1362 U.S. 293 (1960).
' Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 298 F. 2d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1962).
20 Id. at 824.
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concluded that this is an area in which the state lacks
"effective" control and hence is subject to federal regula-
tion. The questions and misgivings which may be raised
throughout the insurance industry as to the effect of this
conclusion on state regulation of insurance warrant a closer
look at the Guides themselves, the corresponding Mary-
land law and the possible jurisdictional problems posed by
co-existence of the two.
I. THE GUIDES
The new Guides set out detailed standards to be ap-
plied by the Commission in determining whether a mail-
order insurer's advertising practices are unfair or decep-
tive. There are fourteen guides preceded by a section of
definitions. Noteworthy in the latter is the term "adver-
tisement", defined as:
"1) Any printed or published material, descriptive
literature, statements or depictions of an insurer used
in newspapers, magazines, radio and TV scripts or pre-
sentations, billboards, and similar displays, and
2) Descriptive literature and sales aids of all kinds
issued or caused to be issued by an insurer or by an
insurer's agent or broker for presentation to members
of the public, including, but not limited to, circulars,
leaflets, booklets, depictions, illustrations, form letters,
and policy forms".21
This definition incorporates the many varieties of adver-
tising which have been involved in previous FTC decisions
in all industries and seems to indicate an intent to clarify
and emphasize the comprehensive nature of the subject
matter covered by the Guides. A brief survey of the Guides
themselves provides a better indication of their scope.
Guide 1 is a prohibition against deception in general
and forbids advertisements which "have the capacity and
tendency to mislead or deceive purchasers or prospective
purchasers, irrespective of whether a policy advertised is
made available to an insured prior to the consummation of
the sale, or an offer is made of a premium refund if a pur-
chaser is not satisfied." 22 Use of words whose meaning is
unclear or too technical is also prohibited.
Guide 2 deals with advertisements describing benefits,
losses covered, or premiums payable and is by far the most
2 12 Trade Reg. Rep. 7904 (1964).
22 Ibid.
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detailed of the Guides. Specifically, it requires clear and
conspicuous disclosure of all exceptions, reductions and
limitations relating to any insurance policy advertised, the
cost of such policy, or the period of time for which any
benefit is payable. This includes waiting, elimination, or
probationary periods; benefits contingent on conditions;
pre-existing conditions; deceptive words or phrases to
characterize the degree or type of coverage, amount pay-
able, or time limitation; and age limitations. It also spe-
cifically forbids deception as to coverage of diseases and
additional benefits.
Guide 3 prohibits misleading advertisements as to the
importance of the condition of the applicant's or insured's
health, or the necessity for a medical examination, and
requires conspicuous disclosure of any other conditions
pertaining to the insured's health under which the insurer
will not be liable for benefits.
Guide 4 covers disclosure of policy provisions relating
to renewability, cancellability or termination, and requires
that such disclosure be clear and in close conjunction with
any other statement or reference which may, by implica-
tion, concern these subjects. In addition it forbids decep-
tive implications as to the length of time a policy may be
continued in effect if, in fact, it may be terminated during
the time stated by events over which the insured has no
control.
Guide 5 requires that all testimonals, appraisals or
analyses used in any advertisement represent the current
opinion of the author and be genuine, accurate, applicable
to the policy or insurer advertised, and a correct reflection
of the present practices of the insurer. It also notes that
an insurer makes as his own all statements contained in
any testimonial which he uses, and the advertisement
which incorporates it is subject to all provisions of the
Guides.
Guide 6 forbids any deceptive use of statistics, includ-
ing those relating to time within which claims are settled,
number of claims paid or persons insured, and generosity
of claim settlements.
Guide 7 requires identification of plans under which
different amounts of benefits are payable together with
disclosure that the premium will vary with the amount of
benefits. It also requires clear disclosure that advertised
benefits are provided only through a combination of
policies, if such is the case.
MAIL-ORDER INSURANCE
Guide 8 prohibits deception as to introductory, initial,
or special offers.
Guide 9 deals with misrepresentation as to licensing,
approval, or endorsement of insurer, policy or advertise-
ment by any individual, governmental agency, society,
association or other group.
Guide 10 provides that no advertisement is to represent
falsely that policyholders become group or quasi-group
members or enjoy special rates or privileges usually asso-
ciated with group insurance.
Guide 11 forbids deceptive advertising of benefits pay-
able under a "family group" policy.
Guide 12 bars deceptive use of trade names, service
marks, slogans, symbols, etc. concerning the identity of the
insurer or its relation with public or private institutions.
Guide 13 forbids false disparagement of competitors
and their policies, services, or business methods.
Guide 14 is the last, and it provides that no advertise-
ment shall be used which could mislead a prospective pur-
chaser with respect to an insurer's assets, corporate struc-
ture, financial standing, age or relative position in the
insurance business, or in any other material respect.
II. CumwNT MARYLAND LAW
There are three areas, Titles 3, 14 and 15, of the new
Maryland Insurance Code,23 effective December 3, 1963,
which bear more or less directly on the question of mail-
order insurance regulation and which determine its extent
and effectiveness in Maryland.
Title 3 deals with the general requirements for licensing
insurers doing business in Maryland.24 Obtaining a certifi-
cate of authority to do insurance business in Maryland is
made an absolute prerequisite for all insurers and would
be applicable to any mail-order firm whether organized in
Maryland or not. It is clearly intended to prevent any
insurer, mail-order or otherwise, from doing business in
this state without meeting the licensing requirements, or
from using Maryland as a base to do business in other states
without first being licensed for the same kind of business
in Maryland.25 Violations of these or any other provisions
in the Code are punishable by a general fine of not more
than $1,000 in addition to any other administrative pen-
23 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
24 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 42-61 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
25 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 42 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
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alty.26 These provisions, which together are calculated to
bar unlicensed insurers from operating in or from Mary-
land, are on a par with the law of most states,27 though
they are less stringent than some 28 and more stringent than
those few which currently provide the base of operations
for a great many mail-order insurance companies.29 This
section of the Code sets out general requirements for cer-
tification which are similar to those in the majority of
states:"° minimum capital and surplus requirements;31
minimum deposit requirements; 32 good management and
affiliations;3 3 appointment of the Insurance Commissioner
as attorney for service of process; 34 requirements of annual
statements;3 5 use of resident agents and countersignature
of all policies by them. 6
Title 14 deals with unauthorized insurers. This, basic-
ally, is the Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Process Act
37
and is designed to enable the state to obtain jurisdiction
over any unauthorized insurer, including mail-order com-
panies, "doing business" 38 in or having sufficient contact39
with the state to warrant subjecting it to suit either by the
state or, probably, by a resident thereof.40 Maryland's
statute, like those of other states which have adopted the
Uniform Act, enumerates specific acts of the insurer which,
whether effected by mail or otherwise, constitute appoint-
ment of the Commissioner as agent for service:
26 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 12 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
2 E.g., 5A N.Y. Consol. Laws ch. 28, § 40 (Consol. Laws Service, 1961);
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 704 (1953).
2s E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. ch. 58, § 58-4-9 (1962). New Mexico forbids an
insurer, licensed in New Mexico, to do business in another state unless
authorized by that state.
11 E.g., 3A Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 44 (1943, Reissue 1960). Nebraska's statute
sets out relatively few specific requirements for insurers organizing in that
state (§§ 44-125 to 44-137), allows the Director of Insurance wide discre-
tion in regulating matters connected with the organization of such domestic
insurers (§ 44-208.07), and allows any citizen of Nebraska to act as agent
for an unlicensed insurer upon payment of a yearly fee and posting of
bond (§ 44-139).
30 Coucii, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSUnANCE LAW §§ 21:24-21:37 (2d ed. 1959).
31 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 47-49 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
32 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 50 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
a8 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 51 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
a MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 57 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
'5 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 58 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
so MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 59 (1957, repl. vol. 1964), as amended, MD.
CODE ANN. § 59 (Supp. 1964).
'" MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 202-11 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
Is See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943). For further
discussion of this test for jurisdiction see 29 AM. Jun. Insurance § 67
(1960) ; 2 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 21:61, 21:68 (2d ed.
1959).
11 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 161
A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
40 See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 2d 416, 423 (1955).
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".... (1) the issuance or delivery of contracts of insur-
ance to residents of this State or to corporations au-
thorized to do business therein, (2) the solicitation of
applications for such contracts, (3) the collection of
premiums, membership fees, assessments, or other
considerations for such contracts, or (4) any other
1141transaction of insurance business ... .
Section 201, the only section in this title that is not part
of the Uniform Act, provides in subsection (a) that no one
shall represent or aid, directly or indirectly, any unauthor-
ized insurer.42 Subsection (b) prohibits, in detail, the pub-
lishing, broadcasting, or distribution of advertising matter
for any unauthorized insurer.43 This latter prohibition has
been construed as applying even to reinsurance, which is
excepted from the terms of subsection (a), thus giving the
broadest possible scope to the sanctions in (b) against
serving as the vehicle for an unauthorized insurer's adver-
tising.44
Title 15 of the Code deals with unfair trade practices.
Essentially this is the Model Fair Trade Practices Act4 5
which has been enacted in one form or another by all states
in order to preclude federal regulation in that area and to
conform to the purpose of Congress when it passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act delegating the regulation of in-
surance to the states.4 6 Maryland's statute prohibits, in
general language, all unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of in-
surance,47 and provides for issuance of cease and desist
orders by the Commissioner of Insurance in connection
with such practices. 48 It provides for discretionary action
by the Commissioner as to undefined practices that may be
unfair49 and then lists various deceptive practices specifi-
cally barred: misrepresentation and false advertising of
policies;5" false information or advertising generally;51 de-
famation of any person engaged in or proposing to engage
"MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 204 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
'MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 201(a) (1957, repl. vol. 1964). See also
Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 818 (1946);
Annot., 10 A.L.R. 2d 950, 965 (1950).
" MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 201(b) (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
"Recent Opinions of Attorneys General, INs. L.J. (June, 1964), p. 350.
41 AID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 212-34 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
41 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 212 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
17 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 213-14 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
41 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 215 (1957, repL vol. 1963).
" MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 216 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
50 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 217 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
11 M[D. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 218 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
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in the business of insurance; 2 boycott, coercion and intimi-
dation resulting in unreasonable restraint of or monopoly
in the business of insurance;53 false financial statements;54
stock operations and advisory board contracts; 5 unfair dis-
crimination; 6 rebates; 57 use of insurance as an inducement
to the purchase of goods, services, securities, commodities
or peridocal subscriptions ;58 "twisting";59 favored agent or
insurer;60 interlocking ownership or management;"' illegal
dealing in premiums and improper charges for insurance; 2
fictitious groups;6 3 and misleading names deceptively im-
plying that a person is an insurer when he is not.64 The
remainder of the title is composed of sections constituting
the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act, 5
which provides for the same type of substituted service as
the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act. Taken together,
the provisions in this title cover substantially the same
subject matter as do the new FTC Guides and were obvi-
ously enacted in the belief that they would be sufficient to
keep the regulation of insurance entirely under state con-
trol. The issuance of the new Guides, however, indicates
that this belief may have been erroneous and the question
now is: to what extent is Maryland or state regulation
effective in controlling the mail-order insurance industry
and to what extent has or will this business come under
federal regulation?
III. JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS
The jurisdictional problems which are likely to arise
in connection with the new FTC Guides are a product of
the changing regulatory scope of the FTC in this area, evi-
62 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 219 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
r' MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 220 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
54 AID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 221 (1957, repl. viol. 1964).
55 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 222 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
56 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 223, 226 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
5' MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 224,226 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
5S 'MID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 224A (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
A ID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 227 (1957, repl. vol. 1964). This refers to
statements misrepresenting or making incomplete comparisons as to terms
of policies for the purpose of inducing a policyholder to lapse, retain,
convert, etc., any insurance policy.
60 MID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 228 (1957, repl. vol. 1964). The practice
referred to here is the requiring, as condition precedent to loaning money
secured by property, extending or renewing loans and mortgages, or selling
property under contract, that the owner of the property place, continue or
renew insurance on the property through a particular insurer or broker.
" AID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 229 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
62 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 230 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
0' MID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 231 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
" MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 234 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
" AID. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 235-40 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
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denced by the direction recent decisions have taken and
the issuance of the Guides themselves. Both state and
federal governments have recognized that the growth of
mail-order insurance presents problems not adequately
covered by the existing regulatory system. The central
weakness arises from a lack of effective means or regulat-
ing insurers whose contracts are made in another state and
may thus be beyond the reach of the regulating state. 6
Various states, including Maryland, have tried to alleviate
this problem by enacting jurisdictional statutes, such as
the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act mentioned above,
which specify certain acts that will subject a foreign in-
surer to the jurisdiction of the enacting state and enable it
to protect its resident policyholders.
The question of due process limitations on state juris-
diction which has been raised in connection with such
statutes is one of the two major stumbling blocks to effec-
tive state regulation of mail-order insurance. Although
these particular statutes have been upheld as constitutional
and the acts therein enumerated held to constitute "suffi-
cient minimum contacts" to avoid offending the concept of
due process,67 no state has been successful in pushing its
jurisdiction beyond this. An article by one experienced
insurance counselor has advocated liberalizing the concept
of due process, in particular as to the amount of "minimum
contact" with the state needed to warrant its taking juris-
diction over a foreign insurer.6 Under this view contracts
made outside the state, would provide a basis for assuming
jurisdiction if, for example, the insured property is within
the state, even though that is the only contact the insurer
has with the state and the owner does not reside there. As
the article notes, most current authority is not in accord
with this view 69 and it cites the Supreme Court's decision
16 See Selby v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 189 S.W. 2d 135 (St. Louis Ct. App.,
Mo. 1945). In this case an Illinois insurer sent policy directly to resident
of Missouri who applied for policy after listening to commercial broadcast
over radio station in Illinois; insurer held not "doing business" for purpose
of giving Missouri courts jurisdiction. See also 29 Am. JUR. Insurance§§ 19-22, 28 (1960); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 317-19 (1934).
1, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Parmalee v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F. 2d 518 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 877 (1953), 44 A.L.R. 2d 410 (1955) ; Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
61 Schlotthauer, Mail-Order Insurance: Regulation by Whom?, 3 INs.
COuNsEL J. 464 (July, 1964).
11 Id. at 465-66. See also 2 CoUCi, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsunANCE LAW § 21:53
(2d ed. 1959) : "Insuring property in one state, when the application is
received at and the policy issued from the home office in another state,
does not constitute doing business within the state in which the property
is located."
19641 427
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in State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp.70 as illustrating
the prevailing position. There the majority opinion noted
that the specific intent of Congress, in passing the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, was to adhere to three Supreme
Court decisions 71 which held that the states had no power
to tax "contracts of insurance or reinsurance entered into
outside its jurisdiction by individuals or corporations resi-
dent or domiciled therein covering risks within the State
or to regulate such transactions in any way. '' 72 Dissenting,
Justice Black maintained that the decision would hamper
the state's ability to provide effective regulation and in
addition would give unlicensed companies an unfair tax
advantage.73 The author of the article sees an invitation
to federal regulation in these gray areas of due process
which the state is at present powerless to reach. He advo-
cates amending the McCarran Act to "unfreeze" the con-
cept of due process embodied therein and give the states
greater jurisdictional leeway in coping with unlicensed
insurers.7 ' Assuming this were done, however, and the
concept of due process given its maximum elasticity, it is
quite conceivable that it still would not exclude the federal
government from the field of mail-order insurance regula-
tion.
The reason for this is the second stumbling block to
effective state regulation - the problem of ultimate en-
forcement. The mere fact that special statutes (such as
Maryland's) may prohibit unfair trade practices and give
the state jurisdiction for purposes of administrative cease
and desist proceedings, injunction suits, and probably ac-
tions seeking judgment for forfeitures or penalties pro-
vided by the statute 5 does not necessarily mean that they
afford "effective" regulation in the sense of adequate
means of enforcement. 76 The National Casualty and Trav-
elers cases indicate that the courts have recognized this
problem and have opened the way for federal regulation
under circumstances in which the state, even with tech-
nical jurisdiction over the insurer, could achieve ultimate
enforcement of its orders only through the process of other
70370 U.S. 451 (1962).
71 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938) ; St. Louis
Cotton Compress 0o. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922); and Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
7-370 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1962). (Emphasis added .)
7 Id. at 458-59.
74 Schlotthauer, supra note 68, at 467.
75 Travelers Health Ass'n v. FTC, 298 F. 2d 820, 824 (8th Cir. 1962).
76 See Palmer, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction Over Insurance
Advertising, INs. L.J. 69 (February, 1964).
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states. All previous views to the contrary notwithstanding,
it appears that the FTC will be involved, to some extent at
least, in the regulation of mail-order insurance. Exactly
where and how the lines will be drawn between state and
federal regulation of mail-order advertising is still a matter
of speculation and will, as always, depend upon the cir-
cumstances of each case. Certain delineations are clearer,
however, in light of the two decisions mentioned and the
specific statement in the Guides that they are intended to
apply not only to insurers not licensed in the state in which
they are soliciting but also to those who, if licensed, have
no agents there. The "ultimate effectiveness" of a state's
regulation and its ability to enforce its orders, process,
and judgments against the person or property of the in-
surer will apparently be the main factor in determining
whether the FTC will have exclusive, concurrent, or no
jurisdiction.
Where the insurer is licensed and maintains agents in
the state, the state, under the National Casualty doctrine,
presumably has a sufficient control over the insurer and
will have exclusive jurisdiction.7 7 Where the insurer is not
licensed and does not maintain agents in the state (cases
involving direct mailing and mass communication adver-
tising) the most effective regulation will clearly be that of
the federal government, although states such as Maryland,
while lacking means of effective enforcement, will have
concurrent jurisdiction through their Unauthorized In-
surers Process Acts. The remaining area, where the in-
surer is licensed but has no agents or, possibly, is not
licensed but either maintains agents or has sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" in the state, will also be an area of overlap
and concurrent federal-state jurisdiction. Whether this
jurisdiction is exercised by one or both will in all proba-
bility depend on the remedies sought and the sanctions
available in any particular situation.
Maryland's position in this regard might be considered
typical. Where the insurer is licensed in Maryland, the
state can revoke or suspend the license if licensing require-
ments are not met,'T and can take possession of the in-
surer's books, records, and property if they are within the
state.7 9 The latter is clearly the state's only means of
7It can be argued, however, that even where the insurer is licensed and
maintains agents in the state, FTC jurisdiction is not excluded because
the state still has effective control only over the license and the agent, not
the insurer itself or its practices. Palmer, supra note 76, at 75-6.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 55 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
' United States v. Hopps, 215 F. Supp. 734 (D.C. Md. 1962).
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effective, affirmative enforcement although it can also
refuse to enforce an insurance contract in a suit brought
for that purpose by any insurer failing to meet the licensing
requirements or doing business without a license8 0
Unlicensed insurers are also subject to Maryland's jur-
isdiction through the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act.
The statute specifically includes insurance companies doing
any business in the state by mail8 ' and enables the Com-
missioner of Insurance to subject such an insurer to a cease
and desist order or an injunction proceeding as well as
proceedings to require the payment of fines or penalties
provided for by law." It would also enable a citizen of
Maryland to sue a foreign insurer in this state on an in-
surance contract made by mail outside the state and re-
cover a judgment for damages, or sue to rescind the con-
tract.8 3 With the exception of rescission of the contract,
however, none of these remedies is likely to achieve the
desired result; though Maryland is the state in which suit
is brought or proceedings held, it has no effective means of
enforcement against a foreign insurer which has no prop-
erty or assets within Maryland or capable of being reached
without relying upon the process of another state. In such
a case it would still be necessary to sue on the judgment
in the insurer's home state.
Finally, Maryland can exercise a certain amount of con-
trol over both licensed and unlicensed insurers through
any agents they may have in the state. If the agent is
licensed, his license may be revoked or suspended;84 he
may also be subjected to criminal proceedings and a statu-
tory penalty either for violating licensing requirements 5
or for representing an unlicensed insurer,86 he may also
lose commissions and fees .8  But again it is obvious that
this approach can be of only limited effectiveness, depend-
ing primarily on how important the agent is to the insurer.
In all of these cases, then, state regulation may fall
short of the desired objective, either for lack of effective
10 Griffin v. McOoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
"MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 204 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
s MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 12, 25, 27, 215 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
'3 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 203 (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
SMD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, §§ 175, 175A (1957, repl. vol. 1964), as
amended, MD. CODE ANN. § 175 (Supp. 1964).
88 MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 167(d) (1957, repl. vol. 1964).
MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 201 (1957, repl. vol. 1904); Robertson v.
California, 328 U.S. 440, rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 818 (1946).
87 Mo. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 167(c) (1957, repl. vol. 1964). Some states
also allow an agent to be held personally liable on claims against the
insurer under the insurance contract. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 85(f)
(1945, Supp. 1964).
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enforcement power against foreign insurers, or because at
best its remedies provide relief only as individual cases
arise and only within its own boundaries, rather than elim-
inating the objectionable practice at its root. In such in-
stances the FTC alone could provide effective nationwide
regulation and the ability to reach across state lines to
enforce its orders.
Common Law Copyright Of Architectural Plans*
Edgar H. Wood Ass'n, Inc. v. Skene1
Plaintiff, a practicing association of architects duly li-
censed under the laws of Massachusetts, was employed to
design and compile a complete set of working drawings2
and specifications3 for the erection of an apartment build-
ing. The contract stipulated that all property rights, title
and interest in the architectural drawings were to remain
in the plaintiff and were not to vest in the owner-client
upon completion of the structure. No statutory federal
copyright was secured for the plans or design by either the
plaintiff or the client. The architectural drawings were
filed with the municipal building department of Woburn
in order to obtain the necessary building permit. a pre-
requisite to the commencement of any construction proj-
ect.' A building permit was granted. Plaintiff's client,
Moylan, employed Portugal to supervise construction and
to see that it conformed with plaintiff's drawings and speci-
* This article is being entered in the Nathan Burkan Membrial Com-
petition.I1- Mass. -, 197 N.E. 2d 886 (1964).
2 BURKE, DALzELi. & TOWNSEND, ARCHITECTURAL AND BUILDING TRADES
DICTIONARY 342 (2nd ed. 1963). "WORKING DRAWING: In architecture, a
drawing or sketch which contains all dimensions and instructions necessary
for carrying a job through to a successful completion."
a Id. at 288. "SPECIFICATIONS: Written instructions to the builder con-
taining all the information pertaining to materials, style, workmanship,
fabrication, dimensions, colors, and finishes supplementary to that appear-
ing on the working drawings."
I Municipal building codes and ordinances vary in degree and scope
throughout the nation, therefore reference shall be made to two recom-
mended standard building code forms. NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDER-
vRITERS, NATIONAL 1BUILDING CODE § 102.1 (1955 ed.). "Permit required.
It shall be unlawful to construct, alter, remove or demlolish, or to commence
the construction . . . of a building or structure . . . without first filing
with the building official an 'application in writing and obtaining a formal
permit." Id. at § 102.6. "Plans to accompany application. Applications for
permits shall be accompanied by drawing of the proposed work, drawn to
scale .. " See BUILDING OFFICIALS CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, INC., BOCA
BASIC BUILDING CODE § 113.5 (3rd ed. 1960).
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